The newly emerging regional order has exacerbated the relations between Turkey and Israel, bringing the matter of the Armenian Genocide back to the bilateral agenda. The Israeli government recently recognised the Armenian Genocide. This decision is yet to be approved by the Knesset, which, just 8 years ago, did not find sufficient grounds for doing so, following the pattern of its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Now, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs is filled with pride for ‘fulfilling its moral duty and rejecting attempts to deny’ the first genocide of the 20th century.
Was it worth marring the sacred memory of the victims of the Armenian Genocide by mentioning them alongside Benjamin Netanyahu, who is being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity? Didn’t the Armenian world deserve more than a brief post on social media? Let the Israeli ministers answer these questions to their own conscience. Context matters as well: Netanyahu is heading toward another election with his re-election prospects uncertain, while Israeli-Turkish relations have reached a low point amid the ongoing aggression in Gaza and, especially, in the aftermath of the Iran War.
Unfortunately, this is not the first time that the Armenian world has seen the Armenian Question reduced to a by-product of rivalry between two powers, even if this time they happen to be regional actors. Therefore, for the sake of the Armenian statehood, it is our duty to be pragmatic, especially now – in honour of those who gave their lives for the right to remain Armenians.
The problem, above all, lies with us. In the past, whenever circumstances were to evolve favourably, the Armenian world mobilised its collective potential around a single objective: the restoration of Armenian statehood. It was rightly understood that this was the only meaningful guarantee against the recurrence of the Genocide — for if not this, what purpose does recognition serve? Today, the Armenian world is disoriented and weakened by the nominal existence and pathetic imitation by the remnants of the Republic of Armenia.
Alas, it has long been clear that today’s geographical Armenia is fully controlled by the Turkish world. As a result, the Armenian world, with its immense resources, influence, networks, but only exceptionally slowly reawakening passionarity, has now been put out for sale.
The statement of the Israeli Foreign Minister recognising the Armenian Genocide began with the words ‘it is never too late’. Is it really the case? The response to this rhetorical question was a deafening silence from official Yerevan and predictable retaliatory warnings from Ankara and Baku, for whom the recognition of the Armenian Genocide is tantamount to acknowledging their original sin. Wasn’t it too late after the war of April 2016, when Israel supplied genocidal Azerbaijan not only with equipment but also with its own instructors; or in the midst of the hell of the 44-day war of September-November 2020, or even in September 2023, when Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) had already been isolated from Armenia and Iran by its ‘reliable Azerbaijani partners’, at a time when Turkey had not yet become the dominant power in the region?
After willingly and pragmatically contributing its significant material and lobbying resources during this most recent phase of the Armenian Genocide, the Israeli world found itself on the receiving end of the profound ‘gratitude’ by the Turkish world’s proxies on 7 October 2023. This happened less than two weeks after the last of 150,000 Armenians were forcibly deported from by then ethnically cleansed Armenian Artsakh. And as quickly as the world shifted its focus from the innocently murdered Armenians to the innocently murdered Israelis, many soon forgot about the latter as well. Today, in European capitals and even across the United States, it is Israel’s actions since 8 October 2023 that are increasingly shaping the narrative.
Of course, wars for survival and for one’s place under the sun are not won in contests for public sympathy and universal pity, but on diplomatic, lobbying, economic, and ultimately military battlefields. Yet a military resolution is problematic not only because it violates long-discarded humanitarian norms, but because it may project weakness. Victory on the battlefield must be acknowledged, and thus, legitimised — especially by the defeated and their patrons.
And this is where Israel is apparently late. The Palestinians, along with Turkey as their situational supporter, are unlikely to accept Israel’s tactical victory. In contrast, Turkey’s tactical victory has been fully recognised by the present-day geographical Armenia, and the de facto colonial Armenia’s patron — thanks in part to Israel — is the same one that of Hamas. The Israelis understand this, which is why they’re now trying to court the Armenian world — the one they have long viewed as an enemy and rival, but whom they’re now anxious not to see turned into a useful pawn in Turkey’s hands. Therefore, they started with the lowest hanging fruit: the memory of the Armenian Genocide, which has always been subject to Israel’s strategic calculations – and the current approach is no exception.
Consequently, in trying to secure a reliable ally against Iran, Tel Aviv has wholeheartedly contributed to expanding the influence of a power that has revived its own neo-Ottoman project and today is ever more openly laying claim to leadership of the Sunni world (as it did before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which, incidentally, included an undivided Palestine) — and has entered into an increasingly direct confrontation with Israel. In other words, Israel is beginning to realise that its reliance on the Azerbaijan-Turkey tandem and its own efforts to strengthen it may have been a strategic miscalculation.
Where Turkey was once seen in Israel as a difficult but necessary partner, it is now increasingly viewed as one of the main contenders for regional hegemony and the most serious security challenge facing the Jewish state. Turkish influence in the South Caucasus (on the border with its long-standing rival – Iran) has reached new hights. In Baku, a Turkish mini-sultan reigns supreme, daring to criticise Israel after having received everything it needed from it. In Yerevan, an obedient Turkish satrap and collaborationist has taken up residence – one whose loyalty and obedience to his Turkish patron is still to be contested among the mayors of Turkish cities. Armenia is ruled by fear, instilled not so much by Turkey and Azerbaijan, but by the tacit support they have received in world capitals – thanks to Israel. Therefore, even if Israel decides to use the Genocide matter as leverage against Turkey, it will not shift the newly established regional balance of power.
Paradoxically, further escalation of Turkish-Israeli relations could lead to alliances that seemed unimaginable just a few months ago. In the Middle East, there are no permanent friends or eternal enemies. Under certain circumstances, even Iran and Israel could become temporary allies on specific issues, if both countries come to view Turkey’s expanding influence as the more immediate and long-term threat to their own interests. For different reasons, neither Tehran nor Tel Aviv want Turkey to become the dominant power controlling the main energy and transport routes from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia. After all, these two worthy adversaries have been sharing this region for thousands of years, whereas the Ottoman Empire has not even aged to its first millennium.
However, despite all the (relative) goodwill of Iran and the sudden softening of Israel, for Armenia, the Turkish-Israeli confrontation does not imply advantages by default. On the contrary, rising tensions may further amplify the importance of the South Caucasus as a space of geopolitical rivalry. Under these conditions, the issues of military and political presence of external actors, as well as of control over strategic routes, including the notorious ‘Zangezour Corridor’, now euphemistically called the ‘Trump Route’ (which also appeared thanks to the support of the Israeli lobby in the United States), will inevitably escalate again.
If Israel finally concludes that Turkey is a more dangerous long-term challenge than Iran, Tel Aviv may try to limit the neo-Ottoman expansion in various directions – from the Eastern Mediterranean to the South Caucasus. However, as mentioned above, the possibilities for this have by now been already significantly curtailed. After the destruction of Armenian Artsakh and the formation of a new (albeit still transient and volatile) regional configuration, Ankara and Baku have gained control over an almost uninterrupted strategic corridor stretching from the Armenian Highlands to the Caspian and Central Asia. ‘Almost’ – because there is only one obstacle standing in that way – the southern Armenian region of Syunik, bordering Iran. And Israel’s interest in a region so important to Turkey is hardly something that inspires confidence in a peaceful (and Armenian) future for this last frontier of the Armenian world — before its final encirclement by that same Turkish world.
It is clear that Turkey’s strengthening through the absorption of Armenia and the human capital of the Armenian world will hinder the efforts of Israeli transnational political nation to regain its lost ground. It is also clear that once this goal is achieved, Israel will seek to neutralise the Armenian world in every possible way. This will continue, as long as the Spyurk (Armenian communities scattered around the world) and the Armenian state remain an interior item rather than a co-architect of the regional order in the Greater Middle East.
Optimists should take a closer look at the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem to get a sense of the kind of ‘potential ally’ we are dealing with. We are not saying Israel is destined to be on the opposite side of the barricades with the Armenian world, and this is recognised by more moderate groups in the Israeli society. However, the Jewish state, unlike its imitative Armenian counterpart, in grounded in a deep and internally consistent national ideology and philosophy prioritising first and foremost survival, and only then – prosperity of the Israeli transnational political nation. In these doctrines, the positions on the Holocaust and Judaism will always be above considerations of humanity, historical justice, and respect for other ancient civilisations. The Armenian Genocide will never be as relevant as the Holocaust, even though it was its precursor; the indigenous, non-resisting, and spineless Armenian Christians will always be scapegoats and objects of hatred for the local radicals condoned by the Israeli elites.
In the Israeli state, which today speaks of a ‘moral duty’ with respect to the Armenian Genocide, the historical Armenian presence in the Holy City has not only been denied proper protection, but continues to face serious challenges.
In other words, the new Turkish-Israeli confrontation opens no ‘window of opportunity’ for Armenia — only new variations on the same old risks. That is exactly why the Armenian world should proceed not from emotions or declarations by foreign states, but from a cool and composed understanding of international realities. While we are distracted by the projection of other actors’ foreign and domestic political goals, the remnants of the Armenian state and the remnants of Armenian international influence — in particular, Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act) — may disappear from under our noses.
Whatever happens tomorrow (and one must think about it and be prepared for it), Israel will not properly honour the memory of the Armenian Genocide; Turkey will not give up its ambitions; its Yerevan collaborationist and his Young Janissaries will not stop dismantling the remnants of the Armenian statehood; and Iran will not prioritise Armenian interests over its own. We should not expect the contradictions between other regional players to automatically benefit Armenia. After all, Armenian interests сannot be formed until we create an Armenian aristocracy capable of crafting, pursuing and implementing them.
It will not be possible to ride out the regional upheaval in the style of Turkish satrap Pashinyan and his collaborationists. Sacrifices, as always, will be inevitable. The question is whether we will become a subject of world politics and builders of our own national project — carrying it out consciously and, preferably, not entirely at our own expense — or whether we will allow someone else’s hegemony to be built upon our ruins.
