One of the key demands of the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Nikol Pashinyan, the Turkish commandant in Yerevan, not only does not oppose Aliyev’s idea – on the contrary, he supports it in every possible way. What is the OSCE Minsk Group (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe)? Why is the Azerbaijani-Turkish side so actively promoting the idea of its dismantling? What geopolitical consequences can this lead to? We will try to answer these questions by examining the Artsakh/Karabakh issue through the prism of interdisciplinary mirrors – philosophy, history, political science, sociology and jurisprudence. In order not to go into the distant historical wilds, let us establish a few facts that cannot be questioned:
The first is Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh – a territory where the Armenian population has always been indigenous.
The second is the Armenian population of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh, which, regardless of the geopolitical and demographic changes in the region, has always constituted an absolute majority.
The third is modern Azerbaijan, artificially glued together by the early Soviet leadership, that has neither historical nor legal prerequisites for governing Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh.
The fourth is the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in the territory of modern Azerbaijan in the period of 1988-1991, which is the continuation of the Armenian Genocide, planned and carried out by the government of the Young Turks in 1915-1923.
The fifth are the military actions of 1991-1994, which were the result of illegal actions on the part of the Azerbaijani leadership, namely the annulment of the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and military aggression against the Armenian population.
The sixth isthe independence of the Republic of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which was the consequence of the Armenian side’s repulse of the military aggression aimed at destroying the Armenian population of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991-1994.
The seventh is the political legalisation of the independent status – one of the fundamental pillars of the physical security of the Armenian population as a centuries-old autochthon and sovereign of the Republic of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
Unfortunately, due to political naivety and short-sightedness, the Armenian side, having won a military victory, failed to achieve the surrender of Azerbaijan, conclude a peace treaty and thereby document the new geopolitical realities in South Caucasus. As a result, the victory ended with the signing of the ceasefire agreement (Bishkek Protocols of 1994). But let us go back a bit. The CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe) in general and individual players in particular were actively involved in the conflict resolution process, pursuing their interests.
The Turkish game
This was especially true of Turkey, which tried to use cunning manoeuvres to oust neutral players and sympathisers of the Armenian side from the process from the very beginning. Ankara offered Russia a bilateral format of cooperation to achieve a ceasefire and proceed to negotiations. However, Moscow soon found out that the Turkish side was seeking to use the levers of the Russian influence to force the Armenian side to make unilateral concessions, including the surrender of the Lachin corridor linking Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Turkey played into two camps. On the one hand, it told the Kremlin that regional problems should be solved by regional powers, on the other, it acted as a conduit for the geostrategic interests of Great Britain, interested in preventing the military defeat of Azerbaijan.
At the last moment, when Turks began to link the ceasefire issue with the territorial concessions from the Armenian side, the Cetin-Kozyrev initiative (the ministers of foreign affairs of Turkey and Russia) failed. The United States played a special role in neutralising Turkey. Washington, represented by the Bush Sr. administration and the leadership of the Republican and Democratic parties, supported the Armenian side. Since 1988, the leaders of both parties, represented by Senator Robert Dole (Republicans) and Claiborne Pell (Democrats), supported the demand of the Soviet Armenian intelligentsia for the return of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian SSR. In fact, the United States supported the concept of ‘Miatsum’ (reunification of Artsakh and Armenia) at the state level and raised this issue at the highest level. The White House perceived Baku’s actions as aggression, cutting it off from all programs envisaged under the Freedom Support Act of 1992. At the same time, without having a de jure recognised status, the Republic of Artsakh itself was included in the American state programs.
On behalf of President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher warned Cetin about the inadmissibility of unilateral biased actions and undermining the Minsk process. Washington assumed that Ankara was not interested in establishing a ceasefire, but in increasing its role to lobby for Azerbaijan’s interests. Later, Turks refused to accept the detailed proposals of the Russian Minister of foreign affairs Kozyrev, demanding that unilateral territorial concessions from the Armenian side be included in the plan of points. The United States and Russia always indicated three sides in their proposals to stop the fighting – Armenia, Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. In other words, Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh was mentioned as a separate full-fledged entity, the position of which should be accepted as a fundamental element of the negotiation process. Turks tried to kill this configuration, insisting that it was a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This was the key question.
In the first case, the emphasis was on the independence of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh as a consequence of the aggression by Azerbaijan. This configuration made it impossible to negotiate and make any decisions without taking into account the interests of Stepanakert (the capital of Artsakh). In the second case (what Turks wanted), it was about the aggressive intentions of Armenia, which had started a turf war against Azerbaijan.
The balance of power shifts towards Artsakh
Azerbaijan’s reluctance to enter objective negotiations was also linked to its plans to buy time to strengthen its position on the battlefield. Baku seriously hoped that Turkey would find mechanisms for active involvement in the fighting. However, 1993 came with many surprises for Baku and Ankara. Armenian/Artsakh volunteer units liberated Karvachar (Kelbajar) region, firmly linking Armenia and Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh geographically. In the same year, in order to ensure the security of the eastern and western borders, Akna (Aghdam), Varanda (Fizuli), Martakert, Jrakan (Jabrail), Kovsakan (Zangelan) and Sanasar (Kubatli) were taken. In the same period, as a result of the internal political turmoil, the former Soviet ‘strongman’ Heydar Aliyev came to power in Baku. His task was to review the essence of the conflict and get Russia and the United States to put pressure on Armenians in order to return the lost territories. However, Aliev’s presidency began with the fall of Aghdam, which threw him off balance. Baku tried to use this to its advantage, demonstrating that Armenians wanted to conquer new territories.
However, in reality, the Armenian side had a different iron logic in the need to suppress the enemy’s firing points. Americans and Russians could not help but take this into account, as they were well aware that Baku continued to carry out artillery bombardments of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh from the territory of Aghdam. Aliyev did not give up trying to give the conflict a bilateral character, which began to openly annoy other players. Baku understood that the patience of the parties was coming to an end and the process of forming a serious working group to resolve the conflict was nearing completion. Vladimir Shumeyko, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the CIS, unequivocally stated in preparation for the Bishkek summit that Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh was a party to the conflict and without accepting this fact, it was impossible to achieve progress in the settlement process. Shumeyko was referring to the decision of the Helsinki Council of Ministers of the CSCE of 24 March 1992, which clearly stated ‘the elected representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh’.
Aliyev, who had previously sought Russia’s favour, decided to try his luck in the West, building bridges with the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), the UK and Germany. On the day when the members of the Minsk process were in Bishkek, actively working on the document on the establishment of a ceasefire, the President of Azerbaijan was in Brussels, signing the program of Azerbaijan’s participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program. He also held secret talks with the heads of the world’s largest oil companies, hoping to get political lobbying support from them in the Artsakh/Karabakh case. The Armenian and Artsakh/Karabakh sides signed the final document in Bishkek, while the Azerbaijani delegation refused to do so. The Russian diplomat Vladimir Kazimirov had to fly to Baku with the document to get a signature. The Azerbaijani president understood that the refusal would completely destroy his reputation in Moscow, but he also did not want to take personal responsibility.
He lamented the allegedly pro-Armenian formulations such as ‘taken territories’ rather than ‘captured’, as Baku insisted. The logic was simple – these territories were indeed ‘taken’, because they were used to bomb peaceful towns and villages. A clear motive emerged –Armenians were not aiming to capture territories, but to take them in order to neutralise threats to the civilian population and civilian infrastructure. This motive made it possible to identify the actor-aggressor in this conflict, which could not but worry Azerbaijanis. In the presence of Kazimirov, Heydar Aliyev instructed Rasul Guliyev, the Chairman of the Parliament, to put his signature under the Bishkek document. This step provoked a violent reaction from the radical part of the ‘war party’, which accused the signatories of surrendering the interests of Azerbaijan. However, at that time, Heydar Aliyev had built a clear strategy to buy time before striking a big deal with large oil and gas corporations. During his speech in Parliament, trying to calm the radical wing, Guliyev noted that the Bishkek Protocol was not a binding international legal act, but a kind of a roadmap of intentions, which is purely advisory in nature.
To be continued…
