In one of our recent articles we returned to the discussion of the political responsibility of the ‘fathers’ of the Third Republic and started with Levon Ter-Petrosyan. It is time to continue the cycle about the legacy of the second president of the Third Republic, Robert Kocharyan, crowned by the coming to power of Nikol Pashinyan. The latest declassified documents of the US State Department, analysed by Azatutyun, force us to talk about other components of the damage inflicted on the Armenian world by Robert Kocharyan. It should be recalled that in the short term, at the bottom line, there was a talk of ‘exchanging’ the Armenian Meghri for a part of the Armenian Artsakh with Azerbaijan.
Robert Kocharyan himself did not consider it appropriate to respond to the publication of evidence that clearly contradicted his previous statements and his sworn promise to preserve the territorial integrity of Armenia when taking the oath. His son Levon, who sits in Pashinyan’s parliament, did it for him. It turned out that Levon Kocharyan was quite proud of the ‘achievements’ of the Armenian diplomacy of that period in the face of his father, as a result of which ‘Artsakh would have become part of Armenia along with the Lachin corridor’.
Firstly, Kocharyan Jr. omits the special status of Shushi, which, despite belonging to the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, was discussed separately. Secondly, it is noteworthy that the Armenian MP and the son of the ex-president is proud of the fact that his father, who at that moment had almost all the trump cards in his hands (like Ilham Aliyev now) was ready to voluntarily give up the northern and lowland Artsakh – similar parts of the Armenian world with a rich heritage, like Nagorno-Karabakh, for which the blood of Armenian soldiers was shed.
Now Robert Kocharyan can pass off his improvised bazaar bargaining of ‘Meghri for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide’ as a brilliant geopolitical game as much as he likes, but the fact remains that Azerbaijan found that the territory of Armenia, and in particular Meghri, could be a bargaining chip, much like the issue of recognition of the Genocide, while Armenia was building triangular relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. In addition, demanding recognition of the Armenian Genocide at the last moment only discredited Armenia as a negotiating partner, thereby legitimising Azerbaijan’s future attempts to resolve the conflict militarily.
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the same man whom Kocharyan helped to get re-elected in 1996 at the cost of the country’s future and whom he overthrew later just to continue his policy of alienating the Armenian world from Armenia, made it clear to the world that we did not consider the regions of Artsakh ‘adjacent’ to Nagorno-Karabakh as Armenian, and we had no claims to the Shahumyan region, which was cut off from Artsakh through a genocide, and to Nakhichevan that was given to Azerbaijan. The second president remained faithful to the course of the first. According to the documents published by the State Department, it becomes clear how Aliyev Sr. promoted the narrative that Syunik was ‘given’ to Armenians by Stalin – one of the main anti-heroes of the 20th century, in order to separate Azerbaijan from Artsakh. And not a single Armenian diplomat or leader publicly objected to him, stating that it was Soviet Armenia and Syunik that Stalin drove into the clutches by transferring Nakhichevan and Artsakh to Azerbaijan.
Finally, is it worth saying that trying to increase your security by surrendering exactly what provides it – a part of Syunik, the ‘buffer’ zone around Artsakh and Shushi towering over Stepanakert (which would de facto happen as a result of the implementation of agreements on a corridor to the city) – is extremely reckless, almost as much as believing in the ‘crossroads of peace’? What kind of leader could forget in the first place that, by giving up territories, he would lose the only reliable land border with a friendly state (Iran)? What serious, reasonable and pro–government figure could voluntarily offer the enemy the keys to his fortress (to Syunik, Karvachar and Shushi – that is, to the whole of Armenia)? According to Kocharyan’s supporters – only he, who knew that Aliyev would not agree to this.
Well, let’s thank the second president for establishing one of the harmful traditions of the negotiation process – agreeing to big concessions, hoping that the enemy that wants even more will not reciprocate, while we will show our goodwill and peacefulness to the ‘international community’. At the same time, not enhancing our own security, and thus whetting the appetite of the hourly strengthening enemy by making concessions. Here it is – the recipe of the time-servers of the Third Republic, expressed by the simple well-known formula ‘after us the deluge’. After Kocharyan, we have not only the issue of recognition of Artsakh and Miatsum (reunification with Armenia) unresolved in time, but also the ‘recognised’ territories of Armenia being put up for auction, the demonstration of Armenia as an incompetent partner, and, finally, the notorious deprivation of Artsakh’s representatives of their seat at the negotiating table.
Someone will still say that it was an ingenious geopolitical calculation, and not an extreme irresponsibility and opportunism. Another thing is important: the negotiations were conducted secretly, and Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan learnt the details of the president’s plan only on the day of his upcoming execution. This is what happens when issues of national importance are decided by one person who is accountable to no one, no matter how competent he may seem.
Azerbaijan was a shamefully defeated country at the end of the 20th century, but its leaders did not settle for anything less, despite the fact that in all the options approved by the Armenian side, they only acquired territories that they were not capable of occupying militarily at that time. We (the passive majority) accepted the defeat, despite the worthy rebuff to the enemy by our soldiers, we consigned Artsakh to oblivion, as if it never existed, we no longer understand which ‘enclaves’ have already been given to Azerbaijan and which have not been yet, and we are ready not to grumble at our fate, if the enemy pays at least some pennies for the use of our sovereign territory.
This story has convincingly shown how thoughts about the possibility of abandoning one of the parts of own geopolitical space end. He who gives Karvachar was ready to give up Meghri and cede Shushi, while the one who surrendered Karvachar and Shushi 21 years later, ‘preserving’ Stepanakert, eventually lost it too, ‘suddenly’ discovering that the bigger the enemy, the stronger its appetite. Today we are told that we need to surrender the ‘enclaves’ in order to save Yerevan, and tomorrow…As it turns out, it does not matter in which sequence you are ready to give up your own parts and which ones you want to keep stronger or longer – the result of limb amputation against the background of the immunodeficiency is quite predictable.
Therefore, no one should be surprised that we are effectively deprived of support, as the parts of the Armenian world have been cut off from each other. If we do not learn the right lessons, we will continue to live in the false illusion of choosing the lesser evil, committing the original sin of the Third Republic – the surrender of the Armenian state piece by piece for the sake of the short-term ‘self-preservation’. In the gaping void of every such piece, the enemy is laying a mine under our statehood, identity, and very existence.
To the rest of accomplices of the current tragedy and its main culprit Pashinyan, the brainchild of the leadership of the Third Republic – do not flatter yourselves, but freeze and wait for the next foreign ministry of another country to suddenly tell what else you promised the enemy behind the backs of your citizens.
