Recently, the supreme capitulator ‘reacted’ to Aliyev’s threats and revelations with a long list of criteria that will form the basis of the so-called ‘peace treaty’ between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Let’s put aside the question of why to sign the ‘peace’ if you did not show up for the war and figure out what the ‘principles’ promulgated by the Armenian Prime Minister mean in the language of real politics, and not cheap newspaper headlines.
Clause 1. To mutually refrain from escalating rhetoric.
Translation. Armenia will renounce any moral grounds for restoring justice in future and justice in general. It is obvious that an artificial ‘balance’ in circumstances where there is a winner who got everything, permanently fixes the situational defeat of the latter, depriving it of diplomatic levers and the right to form its own educational system and information agenda. Armenia is a country without spatial ambitions, while Azerbaijan does not even need to symbolically justify itself for ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and the seizure of the sovereign territory of Armenia.
Clause 2. To continue the process of border delimitation based on the experience of the border delimitation in the Berkaber-Voskepar section and the regulations of joint work of the delimitation commissions of the two countries.
Translation. Armenia will continue to voluntarily retreat from strategic heights, leaving its soldiers and civilians at gunpoint and constant psychological terror of the enemy. Armenia is ready to give Azerbaijan everything that was accidentally transferred to them according to yet another Soviet map, not demanding in return our true enclave – Artsvashen.
Clause 3. To conclude a peace treaty that is 90% ready.
Translation. Azerbaijan has achieved guarantees for fulfilling 90% of its requirements, so the remaining 10% must be fulfilled. We need to hurry up and fulfil all the conditions in order to find ourselves in the peaceful tentacles of our ‘partner’ as soon as possible. And it does not matter that each fulfilled condition only increases its appetite – there are still as many as 29,754 square kilometres and the lives of millions of Armenians left to satisfy it.
Clause 4. To implement the ‘Crossroads of Peace’ project.
Translation. Armenia will become a public thoroughfare for the enemies and their hub for transporting weapons against itself, selling the security of Syunik, the peaceful lives of its residents and eventually Syunik itself, the border with Iran and control over its own communications for pennies from transit – if we are lucky enough and they pay. Although Pashinyan is most likely to follow up on this.
Clause 5. To introduce a joint mechanism for investigating violations of the ceasefire regime.
Translation. The situation on the border – and reporting on it – will depend entirely on the ‘goodwill’ of Azerbaijan, which has more advantageous tactical positions. The Armenian military will be responsible for all provocations from the Azerbaijani side. The European Union’s civilian mission, the presence of which (for all its imperfections) has significantly reduced the number of incidents and casualties, will be expelled in order to please Azerbaijan, which is much more comfortable complying with the terms of the agreements under the Turkish-Russian monitoring.
Clause 6. To completely solve the issue of detained persons.
Translation. Azerbaijan will return those whom it considers ‘detained’, and not, say, terrorists, criminals, etc. And, as in 2020, Aliyev will quickly replenish his prisons with new Armenian prisoners before releasing all those whom he promised to, perfectly understanding the value of this asset in manipulating the Armenian public opinion – and, therefore, the most expensive thing Pashinyan has: his pre-election points.
Clause 7. To work with full intensity on solving the issue of clarifying the fate of missing persons, whose whereabouts are considered unknown.
Translation. An attempt to sweeten the pill in the style of the previous clause, as if Armenians also ‘get’ something from signing the capitulation, which will not bring peace. Azerbaijan has exclusive access to almost all territories where there might be bodies of the dead. ‘Full intensity’ does not mean anything, and hundreds of families will hope in vain to find at least the remains of their soldiers – although a few might get ‘lucky’.
Clause 8. To waive claims against each other, including, but not limited to, in international courts.
Translation. Azerbaijan and its leadership will never bear legal responsibility for the agonising deaths of Armenian children, women, elderly, doctors, and for the destruction of millennial cultural and spiritual heritage. By voluntarily withdrawing Azerbaijani crimes against humanity from international courts, we and our future generations will never be heard in international instances, both for legal and moral reasons, and we will deservedly become not only ‘doormats’ but also outcasts for tolerating such crimes. Azerbaijan will be able to continue to unfoundedly accuse Armenia of all mortal sins – and the International Court of Justice will not object to it, as it does now. Our word will be against theirs without any judge, and there will not be a word of ours either. (see Clause 1).
Clause 9. To work on the full and effective implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement.
Translation. We have already gone through this after 2020. Armenia fully and effectively fulfils all the conditions and hopes that Azerbaijan will fulfil its own. However, now it will be impossible to complain significantly (see Article 1). It is clear that work is a process, not a result, so it will be difficult to object if Azerbaijan returns prisoners or bodies of those killed during the Second Artsakh War, when Armenia will no longer exist as a political entity.
Clause 10. To form a mechanism for negotiations on mutual control over quotas for weapons and restrictions on their use.
Translation. Armenia will be limited in its ability to acquire weapons already during the negotiations, while Azerbaijan will continue to arm itself. Azerbaijan will receive full information about the Armenian military arsenal. Even if Azerbaijan stops buying certain weapons (which is excluded), the absolute military-technical predominance of Azerbaijan, established by 2020, will be recorded. In addition, the enemy has almost unlimited opportunities to acquire technical innovations and functional analogues of weapons for which quotas will be set.
Clause 11. To comprehensively discuss issues related to refugees from both countries, forming a joint professional expert committee after the establishment of peace.
Translation. By the first formulation, the rights of Armenians who became refugees as a result of ethnic cleansing in Baku, Sumgait, Gandzak, and Artsakh (including Shahumyan) are at best equated with the rights of Azerbaijanis who peacefully and mostly leisurely left their places of residence in Soviet Armenia. Moreover, according to the rhetoric of the Armenian leadership, it is obvious that the ‘joint professional expert committee’, which will have to deal with this task, will come to a ‘consensus’ only regarding the mythical ‘Western Azerbaijanis’, whose number is constantly growing in the mouths of the Azerbaijani state propaganda. Meanwhile, it is obvious that for 99% of Armenian refugees of all waves the issue of living under the Azerbaijani jurisdiction is not on the agenda. As for the Azerbaijanis, their state will support them at the highest level in the issue of ‘repatriation’ to Armenia. Unless, of course, it forces the ‘repentant’ Armenia itself to finance their relocation and accommodation – there should be no doubt of that.
Clause 12. To dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group.
Translation. We forever renounce the only legitimate platform for resolving the Karabakh conflict, which does not recognise it as settled and at least did not deny the right of the Armenians of Artsakh to self-determination. By doing so, we demonstrate our agreement with the forced dearmenisation of Artsakh by Azerbaijan. We are so strong and tough that we refuse the mediation by friendly countries to us – France and the United States, and we even make our own decision on the dissolution of the format, which was not established by us. We prefer to resolve our issues with Turkey, which has sought vainly to join such an ‘unimportant’ Minsk Group for many years. Finally, we abandon the imperfect mechanism in order to replace it with…nothing.
