Armenia Caught between Boomerangs and Backstabs

Recently we once again saw the foreign minister of a ‘superpower’ whining to a newspaper about its ‘good neighbour and important partner’, the Turkish Republic. Mr Lavrov feels ‘perplexed’ about Turkey’s weapons supplies to Ukraine alongside its concurrent attempts to be an intermediary in Russia-Ukraine talks.

For one thing, we’ve witnessed this perplexity before. This was when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet in Syrian airspace in 2015, followed a year later by the assassination of Andrei Karlov, the Russian Ambassador in Turkey – with impunity. Let us recall what happened during that year and why Turkish Sultan Erdoğan sensed no pressure to realign his policies towards Russia. It was summertime and the Russians’ longing for Turkish beaches that intervened. A longing so strong that Erdoğan, despite Putin’s initial insistence, didn’t even bother offering a simple man-to-man apology. Very well timed, just right for the summer season, tomato harvest, and the upcoming military coup d’état attempt.

Secondly, it was Russia that in November 2020 assumed the role of such an ‘intermediary’, acting as a guarantor of peace and signing a tri-party ceasefire agreement with Armenia and Azerbaijan, in spite of having supplied arms to both sides, disproportionately more so to Azerbaijan, which, unlike Armenia, was not declared a strategic ally. Nevertheless, Russia quickly renounced the role of an intermediary, effectively becoming a third party to the agreement, showing zero interest in enforcing the relevant commitments on Azerbaijan’s part.

Nor, of course, was Russia disillusioned by the aftermath of the 44-day war that preceded that ceasefire agreement, which served as an official invitation for Turkey’s re-entry to the region within historically Russian sphere of influence. Consequently, the downing of a Russian military helicopter from de facto Turkish-controlled Azeri exclave Nakhijevan on the night of the same ceasefire, for which no one was – again – held liable, and the fate of the Russian-Turkish ‘monitoring’ centre in Akna (also known as Aghdam), which became solely Turkish in less than 3 years, merely expanded the list of slaps and ‘back stabs’. This Turkification of the ‘monitoring centre’ was preceded by ethnic cleansing of Armenians of Artsakh (Karabakh) in 2023 by Azerbaijan under the watchful eye of Russian peacekeepers , which was launched immediately after the inconsequential – again – execution of those same Russian peacekeepers in their car). Mother Russia has been ready to endure a lot ‘without giving in to emotions’ and sticking to ‘realism’.

So what that Turkey welcomes Russia’s neighbours (Finland in particular) into NATO and brings the North Atlantic Alliance even closer to Russia’s borders? You don’t get it, it’s a cunning plan to dismantle the collective West from within. Turkey pressures to extend the grain deal in Ukraine, benefiting primarily Turkey? Why not turn the other cheek! Utilises Russian cash and technology to compete with Russia in the energy market tomorrow and to substitute it as an alternative supplier for Western countries? Well, what can you do, it appears one must align with genuine realists to emulate them. Builds huge mosques in Crimea, supports the ‘separatism’ of Crimean Tatars, Turkifies the southern coast of the peninsula, and asserts outright claims to it? Never mind, eventually Russian people will accept and forgive anything. They’re Christians, right?

After all, ‘if only there was no war’, that has not so much concealed Russia’s avoidance as has delayed a direct confrontation with Turkey for some time now. It is perfectly normal to not want a war. Armenia didn’t (and doesn’t) want it either. And the Armenians naively believed that Russia was strong enough to contain Turkey and no one looked forward to Russia’s immediate help in a war with Azerbaijan. Instead, it turned out that Russia was not an alternative to Turkey, but an extension of its bloody claws, just like in 1915. Such ‘mnogokhodovochka’ (multi-step ‘canny’ combinations) have always ended tragically for Armenia, but one should not forget that they also brought about the collapse of the Russian Empire.

Russia, needless to say, is not responsible for our confusion of strategic alliance with patronage and our eventual irrelevance to it. Nor is it the fault of Lavrov and Karlov who were born with Armenian roots and, despite their Russian surnames, eventually fell victim to Turkey – either physically or professionally. And certainly, we are the only ones accountable for our expectations from the ‘alliance’ with Russia, as well as from those ‘Armenian roots’. But we are also the ones responsible for preventing people of ‘Armenian descent’ from serving foreign empires at the expense of Armenian interests in the future.

Yet, we must not forget one thing: an 18-year-old Armenian soldier could not accept what a major nuclear power now tolerates. He did not shy away from confronting what that power fears so deeply that it chooses to expose its back to the knife instead. The Armenian warrior was stabbed from behind, but unlike the leadership of the nuclear power and the Armenians who are building the ephemeral Real Armenia, he did not opt for that choice.

So, we are perplexed about just one thing: how often and how long can one stay perplexed. Eventually, one can at least express occasional concern, and after a few drinks, even a profound one.