Four years ago, the most shocking and, at the time, the most tragic document in the history of the Third Republic, the Tripartite Statement on the Ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh between Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, was signed. In fact, it only involved unilateral concessions by Armenia, a vague provision regarding the reopening of all communications in the region, and commitments to exchange prisoners of war. Only the obligations of the Armenian side were fulfilled and unreservedly, whereas numerous Armenian prisoners were never released by Azerbaijan. The futility of that statement reached its apogee with the blockade of Artsakh and the final violation of the ceasefire, which resulted in the complete exodus of Armenians from the second Armenian state. Thus, after the black September of 2023, there were even more doubts in the expediency of retaining commitment to such an agreement.
Yet from Nikol Pashinyan’s administration’s statements, it emerges that the 9-10 November 2020 Ceasefire Statement (hereinafter referred to as the Statement) is of key importance for the legal security architecture of the Armenian state. Given the lack of genuine leadership and the erosion of authority, it is no wonder that there is controversy in Armenia over the nature and meaning of this Statement. Advocates of Armenia’s pro-Russian foreign policy argue that the Statement is important because it is the only one to mention Nagorno-Karabakh; in fact, it is valuable to them due to its reference to Russia’s role as an alleged guarantor of the security of both Armenia and Artsakh. At the same time, they keep on calling this statement a capitulation. Pro-Western politicians and public figures assess the Statement as a handover of the fate of Armenia and Artsakh to Russia, which has subsequently failed to fulfil its peacekeeping responsibilities towards the Armenian population of the region. Some believe that in fact (sic!) the Statement violates the foundations of Armenia’s constitutional order since it was never ratified by the parliament. Lastly, there is a lack of unanimity as to whether the Statement is an international treaty or a mere political proclamation. The territorial claims made by Baku and Moscow against Yerevan regarding the so-called ‘Zangezur corridor’ from the annexed regions of Artsakh to Nakhijevan, which ostensibly should be opened under Russian oversight pursuant to the Statement, deserve particular attention. In this piece, we will discuss all of these issues from the standpoint of international treaty law. This paradigm is sadly lacking both in public discourse and in Nikol Pashinyan’s braindead official policies.
An international treaty or not?
An international treaty is an agreement concluded between states and other subjects of international law (e.g., international organisations) in writing, regardless of whether such an agreement is contained in one or more documents and whatever name those are given (convention, treaty, agreement, charter, protocol, etc.). Such an agreement is an arrangement to establish, modify, or terminate the rights and obligations of a party(ies) under international law.
Whether the act in question is an international treaty or not depends on the will of the parties in entering into it: for example, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which proclaimed the principles of inviolability of borders and respect for human rights for the European political space, is not an international treaty since its signatories declared that the Act constituted ‘political and moral obligations’ and was not as much a ‘formal treaty obligation’ as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter. At the same time, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) maintains that there is no limitation in international law that would prevent a joint communiqué (declaration) from constituting an international legal agreement. The purpose of an international treaty is the common good that the parties seek by concluding it, such as the regulation of international civil aviation, the construction of an international cable at sea, or the establishment of a ceasefire after an armed conflict. That purpose can be drawn from the preamble, the first articles of the treaty, the prior and subsequent conduct of the parties to the treaty, and the historical and political context of its conclusion.
Now, let us return to the Statement. It was drafted in the closing phase of the 44-day war in writing, in three hard copies to be signed by each side, and aimed, as appears from paragraph 1, at establishing ‘a complete ceasefire and cessation of all military operations in Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone’. The remaining paragraphs 2 to 9 outline the obligations of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan establishing and terminating rights and duties. Notably, paragraph 6 tasks Russia with overseeing the Lachin corridor intended to link Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan has assumed the obligation to ensure the safe movement of citizens, vehicles, and goods in both directions along the corridor. On a separate note, the subsequent behaviour of the parties suggests that, at least in part, the Statement was of a binding nature on them. For instance, when issuing an order to Azerbaijan to ensure safe movement along the Lachin corridor, the UN ICJ invoked the provisions of the Statement, as both Yerevan and Baku had used its text to set out their demands to each other. Russia did form a ‘peacekeeping contingent’ in Nagorno-Karabakh to monitor the ceasefire, but after Azerbaijan launched another full-scale offensive and annexed Artsakh, Russia, which remained silent throughout the attack, unilaterally withdrew the ‘contingent’ as there were allegedly ‘no more responsibilities’ left for it.[1]
The foregoing brings us to the following conclusion: the Statement is indeed an international legal written treaty setting out and altering the rights and obligations of Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which turned into an active hostilities phase in September-November 2020. The subsequent conduct of the parties demonstrates that all sides to the Statement regarded it as a binding agreement rather than a mere political communiqué reiterating already existing legal norms. The substantial breaches of the obligations under the Statement by Russia and Azerbaijan bear legal consequences, which we shall discuss below.
Why the Statement was not ratified?
For a subject of international law to consent to be bound by an international treaty, the following practices are commonly used: signature, exchange of documents constituting a treaty, ratification, act of formal confirmation, approval, acceptance, endorsement, accession. The parties to a contract may also determine the manner in which such consent is to be manifested. Ratification is not a prerequisite for a state to be bound by an agreement. The bulk of international treaties pass through the procedure of signature and accession, bypassing ratification, as they do not inherently require such a measure. It is possible for an international treaty to require ratification by the competent national authority (parliament or head of state) after it has been signed. Then, according to international law, a party has an obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive the international treaty of the purpose for which it was concluded. A state may point to a clear violation of a fundamental normative act (e.g. the constitution) and not be held to be legally bound by the international treaty in question.[2]
There is no ratification clause in the Statement. Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan agreed to sign the Statement, which was fulfilled. Armenian national legislation on international treaties contains the requirement to ratify international treaties of military nature, i.e. treaties related to military cooperation, peacekeeping (reconciliation), collective security, disarmament, arms control, those involving membership in military and political alliances, military procurement, deployment of Armenian armed forces in foreign states and stationing of foreign armed forces on the territory of Armenia ( Article 2(1)(18) of the Law on International Treaties).
From the purpose of the conclusion of the Statement (see above), it may be inferred that it was necessary for it to be ratified through the Armenian National Assembly, but, as we have noted above, even then Armenia was under a duty to refrain from actions which would have defeated the purpose of the Statement. We cannot say whether this was a blatant violation (if any) within the scope of international law, since it is impossible to derive explicit provisions directly referring to the territory of Artsakh from the text of the current Armenian Constitution. The 1991 Declaration of Independence, which makes reference to the joint resolution of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh dated 01.12.1989 ‘On the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh’, does not form part of the constitutional act, although it is of considerable importance to the Armenian political establishment. We shall emphasise here that Nikol Pashinyan’s administration has indeed faithfully implemented the terms of the political and military capitulation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Substantial breaches of the Statement: what shall be done?
Russia and Azerbaijan are continuously accusing Armenia of failing to fulfil the 9th point of the Statement, which requires unblocking all economic and transport links in the region and handing the control over transport connections between ‘the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic’ over to the Russian side. Azerbaijan and Russia both interpret this provision as Armenia’s liability to ‘open’ a transport corridor for the free movement of citizens, vehicles, and goods through Syunik. It should be noted that official Yerevan strongly supports the unblocking of transport communications, as expressed in Pashinyan’s concept of the so-called ‘Crossroads of Peace’, however insisting on border and customs control to be carried out by Armenia itself. Recently, the Nikol Pashinyan administration has been voicing the idea of outsourcing the maintenance of this critical communication to private enterprises. Baku’s chauvinist rhetoric makes it clear that the corridor pretext can be interpreted as a territorial claim to the Armenian Syunik region, rather than a constructive economic proposal.
Armenia, in turn, has accused Azerbaijan and Russia of failing to fulfil paragraphs 6-8 of the Statement, which ensure free movement along the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Artsakh; return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their places of residence; exchange of prisoners of war, hostages, and other detainees and bodies of those killed. After the annexation of Artsakh in September 2023 and the forced displacement of Artsakh Armenians to Armenia, the Lachin corridor ceased to exist, the Russian ‘peacekeeping contingent’ has stopped operating, while the former political and military leaders of Artsakh are being held prisoner in Baku. Let us now discuss the executability of the Statement in terms of the notion of a material breach of an international treaty and the implications of such a breach.
International treaty law envisages the materiality criterion as key to the entitlement to unilateral suspension and/or termination of a treaty by a party state. A material breach is defined as (1) an unlawful refusal of an international treaty; (2) a breach of a provision essential to the fulfilment of the subject and objectives of the treaty. A material breach is not bound up with the notion of essential terms of the treaty: a material breach of even supporting clauses of an international treaty entitles the aggrieved party to invoke the above-mentioned toolkit.
The confrontation with the Russian-Azerbaijani alliance on the issue of the so-called ‘Zangezur corridor’ is also subject to international legal framework, so the current state of affairs should be turned in our favour through this perspective as well. The objectives of the Statement were as follows: a ceasefire following the 44-day war (see above); arranging the post-war maintenance of Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin corridor; formalising Azerbaijan’s capture of vast territories in Artsakh; humanitarian issues. After the prolonged blockade of Artsakh, perpetrated in violation of international law and condemned by the UN ICJ, the military annexation of Artsakh, massive war crimes and crimes against humanity, the forced displacement of Artsakh Armenians and the termination of the work of the ‘Russian peacekeeping contingent’, Armenia is entitled to unilaterally suspend and (or) terminate the Statement due to the substantial violations thereof and rightfully withhold the so-called unblocking of transport communications from Russia and Azerbaijan (see above).
As armed aggression is naturally a perpetual element of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Nikol Pashinyan may continue intimidating his own people with yet another war as long as he pleases. Nevertheless, Armenia has a solid point for other actors of international affairs who have interests in the region, such as Iran, the United States, and the European Union. As stakeholders in Armenia’s participation in the Middle Corridor, Brussels and Washington would be compelled to reckon with Armenia’s view on the necessity of ensuring the safe return of Armenians to Artsakh, and to accelerate the enhancement of the humanitarian situation for Armenians and Armenia. These measures are explicitly stated by the UN ICJ in its orders. It is common knowledge that, at least for European nations, the enforcement of acts of international courts is an important aspect of their national role conception, as evident in the bitter legal battles concerning the war in Gaza. One must point out that Iran actively opposes any territorial changes in the region through the numerous statements of officials, referring to the intensified pressure of Russian and Azerbaijani leaders Aliyev on Yerevan’s time-server Nikol Pashinyan.[3][4]
None of the above-mentioned actors will rush to save Syunik or return Artsakh for us. Nevertheless, Failing to leverage available resources to apply external pressure on Azerbaijan before regaining our own immunity is perilous for Armenia and the Armenian world. And, of course, the main asset we have, along with our own geography and logistics (it is for a reason that they are so challenging – therefore, they are far more appreciated by everyone around us than by ourselves), is the Armenian world. We have been wastefully squandering it throughout the history of the Third Republic, and we must recognise that the international community’s deafening silence is the consequence of that very mistake. The oil and vast territory excuses are just for lazy time-servers, starting with those who signed the first ceasefire in 1994 while being given ample opportunity to force Azerbaijan to capitulate.
Conclusion The belief that international law, in the absence of a supreme sovereign capable of coercion and punishment, is ephemeral and detached from reality is commonplace. Conversely, wise and far-visioned politicians resort to international law and institutions because this might serve their interest, a central concept in realist view of international politics, in the long run. Nikol Pashinyan may scarcely be considered a politician in the way we might prefer, but this should not prevent us from assessing the situation through the lens of international law. The 9-10 November 2020 ceasefire statement formalised the disastrous defeat of the Armenian world in Artsakh, and it is common to express emotional disapproval of this act, and rightly so. However, the robust mechanisms of international law, like any other tools, can and must be employed for one’s own national interest and to make tangible progress for the sake of Armenia and its inalienable part, Artsakh. But this requires a genuine aristocracy capable of articulating that very national interest.
[1] This is the term used for the corridor, but recall that the original name of the settlement is Berdzor.
[2] A breach is flagrant if it is plainly manifest to any state acting thereon in good faith and in accordance with customary practice (Art.46 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
[3] A transit corridor between Central Asia and the Mediterranean region. In this case, ‘corridor’ refers to a high-tech integrated transport system that accelerates the movement of goods, works, and services, freight-forwarding services, and transaction documentation. The US and the EU have no territorial claims towards Armenia.
[4] The national role conception is a set of norms, guidelines, and standards that influence various dimensions of the foreign policy decision-making process. For example, Germany has had to adjust its strongly pro-Israeli stance at the international level against the backdrop of the inhumane conduct of the war against HAMAS and the suffering of civilians, since the peaceful resolution of international disputes and the renunciation of aggression are the key elements of its national role conception.
