After proclaiming independence from Great Britain, the Americans had to grapple with the issue of ensuring the safety of their merchant ships in the Middle East region. At that time, trade in the Mediterranean Sea was highly lucrative and held strategic value for the nascent republic. In 1778, the American ambassador in Paris, Benjamin Franklin, achieved the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with France, however, the royal court denied American merchant ships any security guarantees in the event of an attack by a third party. The principal threat was posed by the piracy carried out by the Barbary Coast countries of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania (present-day Libya). They were formal vassals of the Ottoman Empire, situated in the sphere of the special geopolitical interests of Great Britain. In reality, however, these countries pursued independent policies aligned with Istanbul’s interests. In this way, the Ottomans had de facto control over piracy through them while assuming no responsibility de jure. The primary beneficiary of this configuration was London, which had always appeared perfectly clean. The French made this clear to the Americans, advising them to engage in a direct dialogue with those who could effectively provide such guarantees, i.e., the British.
Robert Livingston, the first U.S. Foreign Secretary, believed that it was only possible to discuss the subject with the Crown as part of future peace negotiations. At the time, war was still ongoing and London was not yet ready to accept a full surrender. In that situation, the head of American diplomacy saw only one way out – the formation of an American-European maritime coalition, which would put an end to the British dominance at sea. Livingstone was a descendant of a noble Scottish family, which had interbred with the powerful American-Dutch families of Schuyler and Van Rensselaer, who stood at the origins of American statehood. Such a crucial mission was entrusted to the hero of the American Revolution, Admiral John Paul Jones. He was also of Scottish descent and had a reputation as a brilliant warrior, reconnaissance, and diplomat. Benjamin Franklin’s stated mission in Paris was to forge close relations with the reigning royal elite, but at the same time he was liaising with progressive thinkers who sought an end to monarchy in France and across Europe.
Admiral Jones traveled to Paris, where Franklin introduced him to a closed circle of elite members of the Masonic Lodge of Nine Sisters. These included future figureheads of the French Revolution – Camille Desmoulins, Georges Danton, Joseph Guillotin, Jean Bailly, and Jacques Brissot, as well as a would-be member of the provisional government of the period of the Consulate and a close associate of Napoleon Bonaparte – Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès. In 1778, the lodge made an extremely odd and somewhat fantastic decision to enrol as its members two Americans, Jones and Franklin. It’s difficult to rationalise the motivation behind it. It’s possible that during his year on the job Jones had managed to get some solid kompromat on some key figures of the organisation, in which case it all comes down to brilliant intelligence work. It is also possible that the Americans succeeded in persuading their ideological comrades-in-arms to resolve to lend them the support needed to defeat the monarchy.
The States certainly had a vested interest in the downfall of the Bourbon dynasty, which would not entertain the proposition of a strategic naval coalition against Britain. This is precisely where the Armenian dimension was first unearthed. Franklin’s main conduit for communication with the progressive elite was the famous sculptor Jean Houdon, whose patron of the arts was the Duke of Orléans, Louis-Philippe. He was a representative of the younger branch of the Bourbons, but detested his bloodline, especially King Louis, who would not take decisions without taking advice from his wife, the Austrian princess Marie Antoinette. There is historical evidence that she relayed to Vienna sensitive intelligence of a national and military interest, that was forwarded by the Austrians to the British. Being a liberal in his views and a patriot, Louis-Philippe stood for measures that would strengthen the standing of France. One of the Duke’s closest friends was Lazzaro Pallavicino, the Vatican Secretary of State, who perceived the need to weaken Britain’s geopolitical influence in the Mediterranean by undermining its main ally and satellite, the Ottoman Empire.
He believed that revival of the Armenian population in the territory of Cilicia could be instrumental in achieving that goal. This Armenian kingdom was once Catholic and enjoyed the patronage of the Holy See. To put such a complex strategy into practice, Vatican needed earnest allies, such as the independent United States. Cilicia, would it be seceded from the Ottoman Empire and ruled by Christian Armenians, might become an outpost for an American-European anti-British naval coalition. The maritime culture of the Cilician Armenians has been known since the dawn of time. The Cilicians constituted a pivotal geopolitical factor in the Mediterranean for many centuries, waging competition with the powerful Roman Empire. Further, such a development could revitalise the grandeur of the Papacy, which was in grave decline as a consequence of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714). Houdon conveyed the idea of using the Armenian element in the pursuit of shared goals to the Americans. Benjamin Franklin was introduced to old Armenian families based in France and Venice. Among them were the Tarriens, who were tightly linked to the Holy See and the senior leadership of the Maltese Order. The matter is that until 1522 the primary function of restraining pro-Ottoman piracy was played by the Knights Hospitaller Order, but from 1530 this duty was transferred to the Maltese Knights, many of whom belonged to ancient Cilician lineages.
The challenge, however, was the split of the American elite into two camps when it came to international politics. The first one being the Hawks: Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, John Adams, and James Madison. They advocated a tough approach to signal the Americans’ resolve to defend their cause to the British and the rest of the world. The second one was an Anglo- conformist group led by Alexander Hamilton, a man very close to General George Washington. Hamilton’s reasoning was that, civilisationally, America was an extension of England and therefore the independent states had to avoid developing anti-British foreign policies. Washington himself favoured the second camp but, for domestic political considerations, maintained neutrality. After prolonged debate and discussion, the Confederate Congress resolved to raise the issue of the safety of American merchant ships directly with the British, who had surrendered in 1782. A year later, a treaty was signed in Paris in which the British officially recognised the independence of the United States. However, they turned down the American delegation’s request to ensure the safety of merchant ships in the Mediterranean in an uncompromising manner.
Not even a year after the Treaty of Paris, the pirates of the Barbary Coast began attacking American ships: in 1784 the Moroccans captured the brigantine Betsey, taking the entire crew hostage, while the Algerians, covertly assisted from London, crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and hijacked the schooner Mary of Boston and the ship Dauphin Philadelphia. The crews were thrown into Algerian prison where they were subjected to starvation and torture. The hawk wing capitalised on these cases to persuade the Confederate Congress to act more firmly. In January 1785, there was an ongoing discussion about a candidate for a new ambassador to France, and the majority leaned in favour of Thomas Jefferson, perceived as a threat by the British. In February that year, Cardinal Secretary of State of the Vatican Pallavicino (the actual ideologue of the Cilician project) died under strange circumstances. Jefferson landed in Paris in May 1785 and commissioned Admiral Jones to take whatever steps were required to resume work on forming the anti-British coalition as quickly as possible.
Franklin’s Nine Sisters‘ connections and Jones’ strengthened friendship with Louis Philippe were leveraged to establish contacts with the Holy See’s new foreign policy chief, Cardinal Ignazio Gaetano. In contrast to his predecessor, he was not proactive and agreed only to mediate a dialogue with Pope Pius VI. The latter, in turn, consented to assist in the release of the American sailors in exchange for facilitating the launch of the first papal Catholic diocese in the United States. Yet Vatican did not care to get involved in any major geopolitical undertakings. One can assume that this was due to the unexpected death of Pallavicino. Even the negotiations with the Moroccans and Algerians were conducted by the Vatican not directly, but through its affiliate Monafort Order. However, the papal proxy diplomats failed to deliver, further bolstering Jefferson’s determination to take more radical action.
The strategic aim was clear and unwavering – to bring about the weakening of Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. But it was almost impossible to achieve this without a powerful European ally. Disappointingly for the Americans, the monarchical regimes were reluctant to get involved in major conflicts with the British. They were accustomed to playing by the rules so as not to cross any red lines. The Europeans were operating in the logic of ‘today’s enemies may be tomorrow’s allies’, something that served to maintain the balance of power. Those rules changed in 1789 when French revolutionaries took over the Bastille fortress, a symbol of the kings’ omnipotence. The American hawks were heartened by these developments and backed their ideological comrades-in-arms in every possible way to put an end to the monarchy.
To be continued…
