The Third Republic
History is cyclical. Earlier the article outlined how World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1908–1922) paved the way for the restoration of Armenian statehood that had been lost centuries ago. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire granted Armenians yet another historical chance. However, this time the Armenian party had fundamental advantages: an internationally recognized physical territory, industrial, agricultural and scientific, educational infrastructure, bureaucratic class, and experienced military and intelligence. Armenian communities around the globe were both motivated and mobilised to back and contribute to the building of a strong country that was to become the home for all Armenians. Yet, let’s emphasise it once again — history is cyclical. Just as 70 years ago (during the 1915–1923 Genocide), the process of the formation was held amid major tragedies: the 1988 earthquake in Spitak and the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in Baku, Sumgait, Kirovabad (Gandzak), and Maragha. Later on, the Soviet leadership not only refused to stop the massacre of Armenians but also took part in the joint aggression against Armenians and their deportation together with the Azerbaijani military (Operation Ring in 1991).
Deportation of the indigenous inhabitants of Ghetashen and Martunashen was carried out at the state level, with the knowledge of the last head of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and the president of the Azerbaijani SSR Ayaz Mutalibov. Under the pretext of passport regime control, more than 6,000 Armenians from 24 villages were deported. More than 200 people died, including Tatul Krpeyan and Simon Achikgyozyan, the heroes who fought against the Soviet-Azerbaijani OMON (special forces).
Azerbaijani military aggression of 1991 against Artsakh Armenians who had voted for their independence in a referendum marked the pinnacle of the tragedies. Such an aspiration did not stem from the geopolitical ambitions of Armenians to establish two states but rather was the only possible mode of survival as an ethnic group and the preservation of their religious and cultural legacy. It was an ‘independence for salvation’ solution, which explicitly allowed Artsakh to exercise its right to self-determination beyond the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the aggression against Artsakh should not have been regarded independently from the earlier ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population on the territory of first the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) in 1918–1929, later on — in early Soviet Azerbaijan (the destruction of Armenian Nakhijevan and the policy of altering the Artsakh demography), and in late-Soviet Azerbaijan (the Sumgait Massacres, the Baku Pogroms, etc.). All these events, in turn, cannot be interpreted in isolation from the Genocide of 1915 and the obliteration of Western Armenia.
Turkey has viewed Azerbaijan as a natural extension of the Turkish world and a special zone of its geopolitical interests. Under its ‘spatial ambitions’ yet another Armenian project was treated as a threat and could only exist in two modalities: either controlled and neutral or subordinate.
‘We must not forget who Armenians are and why they should be considered enemies.’
Suleiman Demirel
The NKAO liberation and the takeover of 7 surrounding districts by the Armenian military elite meant to create a security belt around Artsakh with the tacit support of several great powers and regional players, including Yeltsin’s Russia, Republican America, and Iran, set the stage for the establishment of a regional and global Armenian factor. The firm stance of the United States and Russia held Turkey back, preventing it from defending Azerbaijan to the full extent. Baku managed to recover and rebound for three reasons: 1. the experienced Soviet KGB general Heydar Aliyev, who successfully led the country alive out of internal strife; 2. energy interests of the leading European powers, headed by Great Britain, which sought access to the rich oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea shore; 3. the wasted opportunities on the Armenian side, which acted slowly, inconsistently and naively against such circumstances.
In terms of ‘spatial ambitions’, Armenia should have at least politically institutionalised the victory in Artsakh. The only acceptable form could be a peace treaty in which Baku would recognize its aggression and, as a result, voluntarily accept the outcome of the referendum in Artsakh. Instead of pushing this agenda through and mobilising all the available resources for this purpose, the Armenian side once again confided in outside persuasion and consented to sign the notorious Bishkek Protocol of 1994, which only introduced a ceasefire regime.
‘Called upon the conflicting sides to come to common senses: cease to fire at the midnight of May 8 to 9, guided by the February 18, 1994 Protocol, and work intensively to confirm this as soon as possible by signing a reliable, legally binding agreement envisaging a mechanism ensuring the non-resumption of military and hostile activities, withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and restoration of communication, return of refugees; consider appropriate to continue such meetings for peaceful resolution of the armed conflict.’
From the Bishkek Protocol
No greater gift for Azerbaijan could be conceived, as the only thing they needed was the time to reap the required dividends from the 1994 Contract of the Century to consolidate their domestic reins and build an international lobbying network. Heydar Aliyev did not contain his joy, declaring that the Armenian nation can never prevail over the largest energy players. At that time, Armenia, having won many short-term tactical victories, suffered a strategic defeat. A profound mistake, though not yet deadly.
One can frequently encounter the view that small and poor Armenia stood no chance against the wealthy oil giants. Is that the case? A crude grasp of political categories always leads to primitive reasoning and, consequently, to shallow inferences. Armenia emerged victorious in the war by assuming control of an important strategic portion of its historical territory, it enjoyed enthusiastic communities of millions of people, and it had political elites of the leading powers on its side at the time of need, which provided Armenia with a variety of development tools. On the opposite end were a restrained Turkey and a defeated and demoralised Azerbaijan. This is not ‘poverty’; on the contrary, it is a huge political capital requiring the very least — efficient management.
Israel went through the War of Independence before possessing even as much as half of all of this. Secretary of State George Marshall had been lobbying for the Arab world at the highest levels so that the States would obtain access to Middle Eastern oil. The Soviets pulled a double game, and the Europeans washed their hands of it altogether. The ultimate success of any small people with limited resources has always depended on the quality of ideology and motivation, the aristocracy, governance, and institutions. If the local aristocracy uses the terms ‘small’ and ‘poor’ referring to its country and people, it preemptively shrugs off responsibility for their fate. This prompts the question: is it an aristocracy at all then? Definitely not. Then comes the following question: if not, why does it govern and make decisions?
Revenge and return of lost territories laid the basis of Azerbaijan’s state identity, with oil serving as one of the tools to fulfil that quest. Such giants as British Petroleum (Britain), Chevron, Amoco and Exxon Mobil (USA), Statoil (Norway), Itochu (Japan), Lukoil (Russia), and 35 other companies from 19 countries have emerged as Baku’s natural allies in lobbying its interests around the world.
‘If oil companies from major countries display interest in Azerbaijan’s oil reserves, the public institutions of these countries should express interest in the current socio-political situation in the republic.’
Heydar Aliyev
The task of the political leadership and intelligence community of a country facing such giants is to devise mechanisms to deter them. Armenia had its oil at its disposal on behalf of the global Armenian world, the very presence of which offered the Third Republic unparalleled lobbying and intelligence opportunities. For this purpose, it was required to set up conditions for the professional repatriation and integration of Armenians into the socio-political, economic, scientific and other life realms. The formation of institutions that would produce a new class of statesmen had to proceed simultaneously. Instead, the scramble for power and material fortune of specific narrow cliques was in full swing. The country did not establish its own intelligence or diplomatic training school. The personnel for the nation were being prepared under quotas at institutions of the outside world. Not a strategy of national security, not a concept of systematisation of Armenian communities and their transformation into a Diaspora — nothing whatsoever. The national aristocracy and institutions were replaced by a feudal clan system, which a priori could not undertake nation- and state-building.
Each clan consolidated around itself the relevant figures in the communities (mostly businessmen) to formally legitimise itself as the leading force of the entire Armenian world. In terms of form, they tackled this task pretty well, showcasing nice photo reports and delivering loud toasts at banquets all the way from Los Angeles to Moscow. In terms of substance, though, it was a manifestation of utter failure, as none of these supposedly ‘diasporic’ Armenians enjoyed any legitimacy within their communities. All the leaders of the Third Republic — beginning with Levon Ter-Petrosyan and ending with Nikol Pashinyan — not only did not engage in building the institution of Diaspora but also regarded its formation as a genuine threat to their domestic position.
Not only did neither of the leaders of the Third Republic recognise Artsakh’s independence, but they did not even formalise a strategic treaty with it, which would have laid out security guarantees in case of aggression by Azerbaijan, as well as the red lines in the negotiation process. Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey have repeatedly and in different ways tried the firmness of the ‘Armenian stance’ and its ‘red lines’. After the April 2016 aggression, when the Armenian side did not pursue the logical conclusion to the process of recognition of Artsakh, Baku and Ankara rightly inferred that the Armenian side had neither a stance nor red lines.
Everyone was fine with that. The Yerevan feudal lords ruled the country at their own discretion, outsourcing the security matter to external players, the minions of these clans in Stepanakert relayed their will and desire to the people of Artsakh, and the community groups were granted carte blanche for mock activities such as promoting resolutions of single states and cities recognising the Armenian Genocide. The result of such an arrangement is plain to see: the loss of Artsakh and the occupation of Armenia’s territories. As a matter of fact, the exodus of the Armenian population from Artsakh and the destruction of its churches, graves, and cultural monuments took place with a silent smile of the very same countries that adopted resolutions on the ‘recognition and condemnation of the Genocide’. Now the same actors, confronted in the battle to shape a post-unipolar world, reaffirm the promise of a serene future for several countries if the latter make the ‘right’ choice. Without any exception, such accounts would end in total failure for the ‘chooser’.
