The first modern Armenian state – the First Republic – emerged on May 28, 1918, after half a millennium of external governance, during the war and the ongoing genocide by the neighbor – the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. The independence was forged in the heroic battles for Sardarapat, Bash-Aparan and Karakilis, which for the first time in such a long time inspired the Armenians with faith in their strength, when it seemed impossible not only to build a state, but also to preserve their cultural identity.
At that time a piece of territory where independence was declared was mostly populated by the beggars and homeless – recent refugees from the Ottoman Empire and the occupied territories of Eastern Armenia; ethnic groups hostile to the Armenian statehood (Turks and Tatars). The villages were destroyed and agriculture degraded. The newly formed state did not have its own industry, medicine; traditional economic ties were disrupted and external communications were cut off. All this was happening in the conditions of territorial conflicts with three out of four neighbors. The predominantly mountainous terrain of the controlled territory was unfavorable for agriculture and logistics even in the absence of these aggravating circumstances.
The then Armenian Ambassador to Georgia secretly wrote that Georgia was the only way out to the outside world at that time, but the train to Tiflis travelled once every 3-4 weeks.
During the first year of independence, Armenia lost about 200,000 people, including the first Prime Minister Aram Manukyan, due to epidemics and famine. There was also no experience of the predecessors for building a modern centralized state apparatus. Thus, the founders of the First Republic aimed not so much at state-building as at avoiding a complete social catastrophe and demoralization so that such building would become possible. To overcome these conditions, political will, superhuman efforts and tireless work were necessary.
After five centuries the first Armenian statehood with the capital, where 7 kilometers away one could see the Turkish guns, was not the obvious and the only possible outcome for the neighbors. It laid the foundation for future independence despite all the difficulties and humiliations. During the fleeting period of its existence, the First Republic managed to exceed the territory originally left to it under the Batumi Treaty by 6 times, but then simultaneously lose most of the land and independence. During the 2.5 years that were allotted to the first republic, its leaders failed to achieve internal and external stability. As a result, Armenia was defeated in another war with Turkey and was sovietised by force. Unlike many other former colonies of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, Armenia failed to build a stable statehood. Why did this happen?
Features of thinking about the state
The root cause of the failure is that even then we acted reactively: we were the last to leave the Transcaucasian Federation, and the independence for the people, having been longing for it for centuries, became a forced step rather than the goal achieved. Former Prime Minister Hovhannes Kajaznuni, a few years later, talking about the events of May 1918, wrote that at that time it was no longer wonder about whether we were ready to form and preserve our own state, and whether it was necessary to declare independence.
The need to coordinate the state border with Turkey and establish diplomatic relations has revealed another stable trend in the thinking of the Armenian political elite: to settle for less. Someone calls it realpolitik out of solidarity, but realism mostly explains the sad outcome of refusing to maximize one’s own security by any means.
Foreign Minister Alexander Khatisyan recalled that he felt proud with bitterness that Armenia finally had at least a tiny corner on the map, which, nevertheless, could become even smaller as a result of clarifying the borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Ottoman commander Vehib Pasha had already presented Turkey’s geopolitical goals, hardly different from today’s ones. Such honesty imposed restrained thinking on Armenian statesmen. According to Wehib, if Armenians had demanded Van, they would have cut off the road from Turkey to Iran; from Nakhichevan and Zangezur to the Kura River valley and Baku, from Kars and Akhalkalak to Gazakh and Gandzak. Even then, the provision of 12 thousand square kilometers to Armenia seemed to be the generosity of the neighbor having not completed the Armenian Genocide yet. The 6th article of the Treaty of Batum, forming the basis of the independent state, provided ample opportunities for “muslim communities” to de facto colonize this part of Armenia as well. Turkey also received the right to use transport communications on the territory of Armenia in case of war. Armenia pledged to disarm the anti-Turkish “gangs”, being in fact volunteer corps, on its territory under the control of the Ottomans. This caused disagreements with the great commander Andranik, who continued the struggle in Tavush and Syunik, but then went abroad.
Most of the Armenian economic elite and the intelligentsia of that time did not want declaration of independence at all. They mostly lived and operated outside Armenia – in immeasurably richer and more prosperous Baku and Tiflis – and saw Armenia as part of the Transcaucasian Federation.
Despite the fact that since 1918 they have been systematically displaced from there by competitors from the titular ethnic groups, they chose Europe and Russia as their new homeland, not the newly formed Armenia. The Diaspora also had no interest in the tiny Armenian state.
Among the population, the problem manifested itself in provincial thinking – a curse that the Armenians have not got rid of to this day. Each region wanted its representatives in power, and perhaps the residents of Yerevan had the greatest outrage since the government was actually formed from the Armenians who had previously been in exile or stayed in Western Armenia. On the other hand, the government itself, apparently, did not actively involve local residents in political processes, making them feel uninvolved in the fate of the country and show low accountability for ensuring public peace.
Thus, the small population of the newly formed state became an observer and victim rather than a participant in the fate of their country. The refugees from Van saw the liberation of Van as the first priority of the newly formed State, as well as the primary care for its refugees. Naturally, people in Artsakh held similar positions. The refugees from Sasun lived quite autonomously and isolated themselves from the rest of the Armenians. Generally, since there was not a single tiny nook where people did not suffer the tragedy on the eve of independence, no group of the population was able to entrust the sovereign state with a common goal-setting. Each of them was ready to support the government only if it satisfied their requests, including their sense of security. The latter undermined the key characteristic of the State – its monopoly on legitimate violence.
For most of the citizens of new Armenia, who saw only colonial rule, which systematically hindered nation-building, the idea of independence was incomprehensible and even meaningless.
The situation was exacerbated by widespread mistrust towards the newly created state. Throughout centuries comparison with a relatively full and easy life in the Russian Empire before the First World War for both the peasant and the bourgeois was not in favor of the first Armenian state, simultaneously going through many socio-economic crises.
According to eyewitnesses, the independence was not perceived as something durable in its early months. Eastern Armenia was waiting for the return of the Russian governance; Western Armenia saw itself in Anatolia. Reunification with Russia was both on the political agenda, and in the speeches of the parliamentarians. The delayed adoption of the Declaration of Independence, according to the last Prime Minister Vratsyan, was a signal that not only Armenia’s neighbors, but also the Armenians themselves did not support its independence. Nevertheless, such a transfer of blame to the masses primarily exposes the failure of the elites and the state they lead.
Mistakes in the foreign policy
Diplomatic failures in negotiations with Soviet Russia were largely due to conditions beyond Armenia’s control which eventually led to Armenia accepting the temporary Soviet occupation of Artsakh, Syunik and Nakhichevan. This further questioned the ability of the Armenian state to take military control over the territories. The Kemalists positioned Azerbaijan as a stronghold of the Soviets, and Armenia as a den of imperialism. Georgia, being close to Turkey, thanks to the patronage of Germany also acted in a similar way, promoting the Armenian policy as pro-Russian. At the crucial moment, Armenia, which had not secured guarantees from the anti-Soviet forces, remained in military and diplomatic isolation and was eventually defeated.
The relatively low importance of the Armenian factor for regional and global powers was aggravated by unclear signals and the uncertainty of the intentions of the Armenian government itself. At the very first session of the Legislative Assembly, which took place parallel to the revision of the Batumi Treaty with the Ottoman Empire and plans for final reconciliation, it was stated that the borders of the state would expand as the occupied territories were returned.
At the same time, the founders of the First Republic understood that Turkey wanted to destroy the Armenian factor in the region, and talked about the impossibility of military confrontation. In fact, such thinking, although realistic in many ways, led nowhere and did not explain how Armenia could survive.
In the first foreign policy plan submitted to the parliament for a vote, the relations with Russia were not mentioned at all: Kajaznuni claimed that if Russia returned to Transcaucasia, it would receive the support of the Armenian government. However, until this happened, such games are dangerous. This once again showed the reactive approach of the Armenian government to foreign policy. In addition, it secretly made a commitment not to have diplomatic relations with countries at war with the Ottoman Empire (i.e., with the Entente countries). The lack of clear signals against the background of the diplomatic efforts of the neighboring countries was one of the reasons for the low participation of the European powers (in particular, not yet defeated Germany) in the new Armenian state. Subsequently, after the defeat in the war and its own resignation, the Armenian government, embroiled in a new war, did not ratify the favorable Treaty of Sèvres and finally abandoned it, signing the Treaty of Alexandropol.
Internal threats to stability
Another powder keg was sitting in the foundation of the First Republic – the compact residence of the Turkish and Tatar population in a number of districts. One of the obvious reasons for the failure in 1920 was the rampant Turkish and Tatar agents, due to which the government lost control over certain territories. The Tatars managed to create Muslim autonomies – “shura”, pogroms of Armenians were organized in Nakhichevan.
This means that originally the first function of the state was not provided – the monopoly on legitimate violence on its territory. Kajaznuni later admitted that with Azerbaijan, on whose behalf these groups acted on the territory of Armenia, it was impossible to achieve any tolerable modus vivendi.
In some places where they concentrated, recognition of the Armenian government and its control could not be achieved, even resorting to the threat of lethal force.
Effective management could help to smooth out the existing problems. However, there was a disorder in the government itself despite the fact that a parliamentary republic allows harmonization of relations between the legislative and executive branches of government. According to Kajaznuni, Dashnaktsutyun did not have the courage to declare the party dictatorship openly, thus being caught in the middle of visible and non-obvious aspects of the power, where all key decisions were made by the party and its organs in the shadows. The intervention of the party slowed down decision-making and prevented the government, which obviously had more expertise, from making autonomous political decisions.
It is not surprising since democratic processes can be built only in a strong state, and the desire to combine both led to the following reason for failure – sometimes excessive freedom verging on anarchy.
In the First Republic, the Bolsheviks also acted freely and even had political representation. They rebelled as soon as the Red Army won the civil war in Soviet Russia and returned to Transcaucasia. At the time of the Sovietization of Azerbaijan along with Armenian Bolsheviks’ inspiration, the state forces showed stability thanks to the continued public support and managed to put down the first rebellions. This task turned out to be more difficult in the regions bordering Azerbaijan since Red Army soldiers arrived there to help the Bolsheviks. Along with the seeming democracy, the Armenian government turned out to be capable of repression by shooting a number of Bolshevik rebel leaders. However, partial repressions usually bring an ambiguous and unpredictable effect.
Subsequently, some of the Armenian Bolsheviks supported the Soviet-Kemalist plans to invade Armenia in order to overthrow the republic and sovietize it by force. After the invasion, they turned out to be the only political force that did not call for the Motherland defense.
Moreover, they shouted out the slogans of non-resistance to the Turks since they were allies at that time and acted in accordance with the open consent of Russia. These calls undermined the fighting capacity of the soldiers, and those who shouted them out were not punished despite stringent measures against deserters.
The national government did not fall, but a deep crack appeared in the already fragile statehood: both sides suffered losses, and the society was split on the verge of another Turkish invasion.
Before and after the failure
It was the internal enemies of the statehood who took the advantage of the external isolation. They immediately began to establish Soviet order on the territory of Armenia. As a result, Armenia actually surrendered to the Bolsheviks peacefully, hoping that they would stop the processes initiated under their patronage: the advance of the Turks on its territory and the increased appetites of Soviet Azerbaijan regarding Artsakh and Syunik.
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that Garegin Nzhdeh successfully held Syunik for a long time, resisting the attacks of the Azerbaijani troops, until Azerbaijan became Soviet and the Red Army entered Artsakh and then Goris. This time, Nzhdeh failed to enlist the support of the local population, who believed that salvation lay in Sovietization, thus having to retreat to Mount Khustup. Nzhdeh did not share this belief, since many “red” Azerbaijanis and Kemalists invaded Artsakh and Syunik together with the Red Army.
The population was convinced he was right only when the Turks became free to conduct pogroms and massacres of Armenians. The Armenian rebellion against the Bolsheviks was successful, and the Red Army suffered a heavy defeat.
Meanwhile, the Armenian Bolsheviks, united in Baku, decided to achieve Sovietization without preconditions (the Armenian government put forward a condition to Moscow – the borders of Soviet Armenia of 1914), organized an artificial rebellion in Ijevan and declared the establishment of the Armenian SSR afterwards. They did not face the resistance of the army, because at that time many saw joining Russia as the only salvation for Armenia. On the same day, the commander of the Turkish occupation forces Karabekir and Chairman of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee Narimanov sent congratulatory telegrams.
The ruling parliamentary faction, the Dashnaktsutyun bureau and the government formed by them also accepted the conditions on the same day. At that time, it was assumed that before the arrival of the revolutionary committee representatives in Yerevan, the power would be transferred to the leaders of the Red Army led by Dro and Russian Commissar Silin. The Revolutionary Committee was to include five Bolsheviks and two Dashnaks. The Bolsheviks pledged not to use violent lustrations against the former government and its supporters as well as to support Armenia in establishing the Armenian-Turkish border.
Naturally, the promises were not kept, and in Armenia the monopoly of the Bolsheviks was established as soon as possible and an emergency committee was created to fight the “counter-revolution” was created.
The Armenian-Turkish Alexandropol Treaty, which ended the war between Armenia and Turkey, was signed the next day by Alexander Khatisyan, who in fact had been already retired. Armenia was losing a huge part of its territories, including Surmala, which had never belonged to the Ottoman Empire before. In Nakhichevan, Turks introduced special governance regulations. Armenia was de facto demilitarized: it pledged to limit the size of the army to 1,500 militaries, and the armoury – to 8 guns and 20 machine guns.
Nzhdeh continued the struggle in Syunik even after the the rest of Armenia was sovietized and established an independent state, which was about to reunite with Armenia as soon as it became possible again. Within a few months, it became a place of salvation for the Armenian intelligentsia and the military, and was further renamed the “Republic of Armenia” – in contrast to Soviet Armenia. In February 1921 Syunik remained the only non-Soviet entity in Transcaucasia. Nzhdeh and his associates left it only being convinced that Syunik would remain under the control of Soviet Armenia. Thus, the opposition surrounded by enemies made it possible to keep this crucial region, which was seen as “disputed”, Armenian.
Why did not the First Republic endure?
In the light of the above, the simplest explanation for the failure of the First Republic is collusion between the Bolsheviks and Kemalists. But even taking into account the Armenian Bolsheviks, who undermined the statehood from within, we will omit the reasons why building the First Republic was unstable to such challenges from the players, who although possessing immeasurable resources, at the time of its formation were also experiencing crisis.
The narrative about the weakness of the First Republic leaders against the Bolshevik-Kemalist conspiracy does not allow to learn lessons about what they did or did not do inside and outside the country in order to strengthen Armenia’s position in the foreign policy arena and mitigate potential damage. According to this logic, the government loses its subjectivity and becomes completely dependent on the will and actions of other states. Obviously, Bolshevik Russia, like no other, had no moral obligations to Armenia to sacrifice its interests for its sake, especially when obviously anti-Bolshevik Armenia failed to build relations with this country or at least present their vision properly.
Diplomatic failures, despite active work in this direction, exposed the lack of a real long-term vision for the future of the Armenian state. The current Government did not actually aggregate the interests of the wider society, but served as a transmitter of the landowners’ interests, the interests of the Church, capitalists and other groups with resources, as well as foreign commercial interests. For this reason, it failed to gain broad support of the citizens of the newly created state.
The focus on tactical tasks and a reactive approach to problems did not allow to pay attention to the vital tasks of state- and nation- building in the heterogeneous society. In the absence of radical changes, there was a complete alienation of the disadvantaged population from the elite and the state, which could hardly cope even with short-term tasks. These circumstances increased the appeal of the Bolshevik ideas and promises to obtain resources from the neighboring countries, albeit at the cost of independence, given that the Armenian Bolsheviks used every single discontent to foment rebellions.
Both in 1918 and 1991, despite the immeasurably high price of independence, we received it rather by incidence than by a conscious desire to it targeting all the necessary resources. Both times we stumbled over narrow thinking, where a group or an individual always turned out to be more important than the national interests. Both times we did not frame our vision of national interests and remained observers of the collapse, not the participants in the construction. Both times we have not established an effectively functioning state apparatus and functioning interconnected political institutions. Both times we have not created a stable state, forcing the neighbors to peace. However, this time we had much more time to avoid a recurrence of the situation.
