The issues of Armenians living outside Armenia need to be considered in two main dimensions: country of residence and intra-community dynamics.
It is obvious that the changes unfolding in different regions pose a serious challenge to the Armenian identity there in terms of both the preservation of the nation and its existence in general. The military and political developments in the Middle East and, in particular, in Syria have largely led to the disintegration and exodus of one of the largest Armenian communities in the Middle East, the Syrian Armenians.
There are also concerns about the implications of the mobilization announced in Russia as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as a result of which many members of Russia’s national minorities, including some Armenians, have fled the country. The deepening tensions in the current political relations between Armenia and Russia may also become problematic for local Armenians.
From time to time, problems also arise among our compatriots settled in Israel, which causes great concern, especially with regard to the preservation of the local Armenian historical and cultural heritage. We have repeatedly witnessed inter-ethnic and inter-confessional clashes, which, however, have not been sufficiently curbed.
One of the important obstacles to the development of Armenian communities is the intra-community inter-party struggle, which has contributed and continues to contribute to the division of Armenians. In other words, community life is quite politicized, which has created additional problems for the preservation and development of communities, as well as strengthening their ties with Armenia.
Failure to fulfill the diaspora’s potential
However, in fairness the joint programs implemented by Armenia and various Armenian communities were mostly above the intra-community, internal political processes. When referring to these programs, which undoubtedly had a positive impact on the development of Diaspora-Armenia-Artsakh ties and the well-being of Artsakh Armenians, perhaps we should not lose sight of an important question: to what extent were they conceptual or strategic?
And here we face two parallel realities: one is the reality of Armeniancy, the pathos created by Armenia, the intra-national reality, and the other is the reality of confronting international relations. It turns out that within the framework of Armenian identity, within Armenia, we were guided by the logic of “not an inch of land”, while in the negotiation process we de jure agreed that the regions surrounding former NKAO (Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Republic) should be returned and fade the issue of Artsakh’s recognition into the background. If we are guided by the second logic, and the events of 2020 confirm this, then the exemplary efforts of official Yerevan to concentrate the financial capital of Armenians on the issue of the welfare of Artsakh Armenians or the preservation of Artsakh Armeniancy were not conceptual and strategic.
It turns out that the financial resources of Armenians have been invested on ad hoc basis since independence. And this arrangement has lasted for three decades. No one says that the funds should not have been directed to Artsakh. The development and preservation of Armenia and Artsakh were inseparable. The problem lies in the efficiency of the use of funds, their strategic application. By assessing and analyzing the joint activities of Armenia and the Diaspora over last at least three decades and their effectiveness, we will have a more realistic idea of the capital of the Diaspora. Perhaps, after Armenia’s independence, the authorities lacked the political sincerity or will to recognize that the efficiency of the use of Armenian resources was not just low, but, moreover, had the opposite effect.
On the other hand, there is little mention of how much political, ideological, intellectual and financial resources and capital were spent on the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Or maybe it was a matter of time, a flexible and strategic foreign policy that did not require huge capital investments. In the end, the political and public pressure of Armenians and Armenia on the Turkish authorities on this issue by and large did not justify these expectations of Armenians over the world. The responses and consistency of the key international actors on this issue to a large extent have been a component of the latter’s foreign policy and fit into the context of these countries’ relations with Turkey as a lever of pressure on it.
On the issue of recognizing the Genocide and Artsakh, Yerevan viewed the diaspora as merely a source of raising capital.
That this distribution of “responsibilities” would prove unrealistic could have been predicted in 1994, virtually the day after the ceasefire agreement was signed, when Azerbaijan set itself the task of resolving the Artsakh issue militarily. If we were aware that we would face such an issue if the military balance was breached, and the decades that followed the ceasefire are clear proof of that, we also recognize that the allocation of shared resources was situational. The Armenian authorities left only a symbolic role to the Diaspora, convincing it that they were ensuring Artsakh’s security with these immense resources. The same applies to the agenda of Genocide recognition, the lack of strategic vision of which not only failed to produce tangible results, but also culminated in a new stage of extermination of the Armenian people.
By and large, Armenia-Diaspora relations were built according to a centralized logic, namely, Armenia has always expected to attract the potential of the Diaspora to the Armenian state and not vice verca. There are both objective and subjective reasons for this.
After independence, Armenia found itself in a war situation in which the support of the diaspora was invaluable. The security of Armenia and Artsakh has been arguably one of the key areas of focus in Armenia-Diaspora relations over the past three decades. At the same time, the decentralized model of building bilateral relations, which was used more effectively in the dialogue between Israel and Jewish communities, has been overshadowed.
In the current Armenia-Diaspora relations, the issue of revising previous approaches to cooperation is more than important. No matter how much we try to avoid politicization of the topic, it is nevertheless crucial, what foreign policy Armenia will pursue in determining the priorities of bilateral cooperation. On the other hand, all this is directly conditioned by the internal political developments in the country: some politicians will prefer security, and some will prefer development (we shall not discuss how true or false this contraposition is).
The problem of communities’ assimilation
In today’s global world order, the issue of preserving Armenian communities is more than relevant for Armeniancy. However, this is characteristic not only of Armenians living outside Armenia, but also for diasporas of other nations.
The problem of assimilation is quite tempting in today’s reality. At the same time, for the sake of fairness, it should be recognized that assimilation can be a problem for the more conservative circles of Armenians. The perception is different for those segments of the youth who adhere to more democratic, liberal views. Especially in Western countries, some young Armenians, whether we recognize it or not, do not see themselves as part of the community. This is a normal phenomenon dictated by the logic of the modern world order. At the same time, some of them may not associate themselves with Armenian identity or Armenia at all, while others, on the contrary, will continue to maintain ties with their homeland.
In modern processes of globalization, the preservation of ethnic and national identity of communities in some cases becomes even more distant from practical, real life, becoming part of theoretical, historical memory. In other words, over time, among the descendants of Armenians, the real homeland is perceived more as an imaginary or illusory homeland. However, on the other hand, the same global world order can to some extent contribute to the strengthening of conservative approaches in communities as a counter to cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the case that conservatism will have a purely national or ethnic orientation.
Historical memory is of paramount importance for preserving the ties between Armenians and Armenia, but it is not enough to face the challenges of the new world order. It is necessary for Armenia to be competitive, boost its international weight, and maintain a balance of supply and demand.
At the same time, one of the key questions remains what Armenia has to offer to the Armenian people.
Perhaps the essential importance should be attached to non-linear, non-standard approaches and ideas. It should be emphasized that while the “what the diaspora can give to Armenia” approach used to be in place, the “what the homeland has to offer to the diaspora” approach will replace it. Finally, it should be clarified whether the Diaspora is a separate entity or should be seen as communities that work closely with the homeland. This is an extremely important question, as its answer also determines how we envision Armenia-Diaspora relations in the near future and the development of Armenia as a whole.
On the one hand, the Diaspora are our compatriots who, due to various circumstances, found themselves abroad, most of whom continue to reside in other countries, but remain partial and interested in the realities of Armenia. On the other hand, however, our compatriots also represent the countries of their residence, having legal status in those states. Their financial and social capital is localized in the country of residence, hence, from the legal point of view, the representatives of the Armenian community primarily represent the country of residence. As for the intra-Armenian, intra-national field of activity, it is conditioned by the possibilities of Homeland-Diaspora interaction, as well as other subjective factors. Over time, the issues of assimilation of the diaspora will become a growing concern. In these inevitable processes, the fundamental question remains to what extent Armenia and the Armenian community will be able to effectively utilize Armenian capital for the well-being of Armenians and the development of Armenia.
These views are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the “Armenian Republic”.
