This year marks the 109th anniversary of the memory of the planned and targeted extermination and expulsion of the Armenian people from their homeland. A significant amount of scientific and fiction literature is devoted to the history of the Armenian Genocide; dozens of documentaries have been filmed and hundreds of conferences have been held. However, to this day, the key question remains open – what genocide is for the Armenian world. In connection with the events of the last three years, this question acquires a qualitatively new significance since the future of both Armenia, and the entire global Armenian ethnic group depends on the answer. It is obvious that the search for an answer must have a comprehensive, interdisciplinary and multilateral nature. In this regard, it is worth starting with the historical context cleared of populist and emotional background.
Serving Empires
The Ottoman Empire replaced the Byzantine Empire, in which Armenians and Greeks formed the basis of the political and economic nobility. This is all about ethnic groups since from the point of view of a state they were the engine of the Byzantine imperial nation. Eastern Orthodox Christianity and devotion to the ideals of monarchism were its main attributes. Numerous Byzantine emperors from Armenian families (7 dynasties) were seeking to conquer and subjugate the remnants of Greater Armenia and force local Armenians who were adherents of the Apostolic Church to convert to Orthodoxy.
The task was made easier because the Armenian-Persian nobility (defectors from the Mamikonian and Arshakid clans) played a key role in the first division of Great Armenia back in 387. As a result 1/5 of the Armenian Empirefell under Byzantine rule and 1/5 under Sasanian Iran. Long period up to 387 can be characterized as a permanent clash of the Armenian clans (Arshakids, Mamikonians, Artsruni, Rshtuni, Manavazians, Orduni, etc.). In the struggle for power and influence, they used all methods and tools, including support from Armenia’s external enemies. As a result, all these clans transformed from Armenian to Byzantine, Persian, Romano-Latin, becoming loyal servants of the new masters who divided their country among themselves.
The Armenian factor (as well as the Greek one) also played an important role in the triumph of the Ottomans. First of all, this was clearly evident in the support from wealthy noble families who wanted to extend their reach in order to obtain greater political influence and financial well-being. In the end, in the new Ottoman Empire, these elite groups occupied quite a moderate place with their peoples facing a predictable choice – to become part of the Ottoman imperial nation, or to exist as a second class. However, unlike the Byzantine model, until a certain period, representatives of individual ethnic groups could take part in public affairs without converting to Islam – the main attribute of Ottomanism. The Armenians were “first among equals” because, being a Christian minority, they faithfully served the interests of the empire.
Their transnationality was a more pragmatic reason for distinguishing Armenians from the rest. It was an important geopolitical and geo–economic tool for expanding and projecting influence. The Armenians had a well-developed trade and economic network extending from China to London.
Loyal perception of Armenians in Catholic Europe at that time was especially important for the Ottoman court. The advantage over the Jews lay in the Christian religion, and over the Greeks, who were mostly Orthodox, in the apostolic confession.
The rulers of the Ottoman Empire were well aware that the Armenian Apostolic Church had been an ally of the Vatican for decades, and the Armenian princes were in close and even kindred relations with many European royal courts.
In general, as the Ottoman system developed and evolved, the Armenians were divided into four conditional groups. The first group adopted all the attributes of Ottomanism and integrated into the imperial aristocracy. The second retained the Christian apostolic religion, but served the Ottoman elite and protected the interests of the empire. The third one was the Armenian national aristocracy (clergy and creative intelligentsia), striving to preserve the cultural and religious identity of the Armenians not aimed, however, at reviving a separate Armenian statehood. The fourth group is the unorganized majority, being in a state of disenfranchisement. It is obvious that the Armenians were not united and, more importantly, there was no single elite group that could even theoretically found or support a national liberation movement. Moreover, even the third Armenian estate taught its people to be loyal to the sultan and the empire.
This, in turn, depreciate the statement of the modern Turkey about the “desire of the Armenians to destroy the Ottoman Empire and recreate Great Armenia in its place.”
Even representatives of the Armenian elite groups in Europe and the Russian Empire initially advocated granting the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire the necessary rights and guarantees of their observance in order to avoid assimilation and disappearance. The fact that none of the Armenian estates were prepared for the events of 1915 despite the Cilician massacre of 1909, is a vivid argument in favor of the Turkish idea that there is no real Armenian threat. However, it should be stated that the Armenian question existed and was an important element of the great geopolitical game in the Middle East. First of all, it is important to note that the Armenian question (as well as the Greek, Assyrian, Bulgarian, Serbian ones) was an element of the fundamental Eastern question, which claimed the inevitability of the death of the “Sick Man of Europe” (the Ottoman Empire) and the division of its heritage. Logically speaking, the formation of the Armenian political agenda was completely natural and inevitable, being a consequence of deimperialization, which is always accompanied by mainstreaming national issues.
Exploitation of the Armenian issue and Armenian identity
The struggle for the inheritance of the “Sick Man of Europe” became particularly acute in the 1870s and grew stronger over the next 30 years. Each of the parties concerned tried to find additional levers and tools since everyone was aware of the inevitability of shrinking borders of future Turkey due to emerging independent national entities. Some players had deep knowledge of the region and its population (Britain, France, the Russian Empire), others (Kaiser’s Germany) had little experience and therefore followed a simple path – to support the central Turkish government.
The Armenian factor stood out especially among others, as it had the status of a “combined” one. The first is the significant Armenian population in the strategically important territories of the empire, the second is the Armenian nobility in Europe and the Russian Empire itself, which could be used at their discretion, the third is the internal factor of the regional Armenian aristocracies (from Istanbul to Baku).
Did post-imperial Turkey, led by the Young Turks, want to eliminate this factor and get done with the Armenians? Definitely. Did Kaiser’s Germany, fighting against Britain, France and Russia, support it in this matter? No doubt.
Of course, the Armenian tools were used by all parties concerned and, after achieving the necessary results, they were put aside until the “next time”. Did they regret that more than 2 million Armenians were killed and deported? Maybe for a moment. The incident was a logical result of the unwillingness of the Armenian nobility to get out of the state of “permanently used” due to disagreements that were artificially created by agents of influence of the third forces. Some “agile” Armenians, like Calouste Gulbenkian, even managed to work with these forces and earn a fortune (which was then used for the good of far-flung Portugal). In general, it is obvious that 1915 is a natural result of the absence of its own national aristocracy, which forms national interests. The vacuum arising due to the absence of own position regarding one’s fate is always filled by someone and something.
Further events are the logical consequence of the context described above. The main forces that used the Armenian question in their game reached bilateral agreements with the new Turkish leadership headed by Kemal Ataturk. Everyone had their piece of cake, except the early Soviet government; without its comprehensive help the future of the Turkish Republic and its founding father hung in balance. The job was done, and it was time for open and long-term pragmatism.
The leading actors entered a new era of confrontation over politics, economics and trade, and the Armenians were left to enjoy the Arbitration Decision of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson. They knew that it would not be difficult to sell such an outright fiction since Wilson drew a map of Greater Armenia, which warmed the soul and gave hope to make it real.
The reality is as follows. Firstly, Wilson, under pressure from the isolationist majority in Congress, was not eager to assume the role of an arbitrator on the issue of Armenian-Turkish border. He didn’t have much choice since the Armenian question was the only thing British Prime Minister Lloyd George and French leader Clemenceau could offer a hated American. Secondly, the US Congress did not ratify any of the international documents prepared and signed by Wilson at that time. Moreover, isolationist legislators did not allow the president to rush the United States into the League of Nations, which was initiated by Wilson himself.
He did not even offer much resistance since he had a sponsor for his election campaign in the person of John Rockefeller, whose offer on cooperating around the division of Ottoman oil was insultingly rejected by Calouste Gulbenkian, the “oil Talleyrand”.
Thirdly, the United States held separate negotiations with Turkey and agreed on future cooperation which culminated in joining NATO after World War II on the initiative of President Harry Truman.
In the new bipolar system of international relations, the Armenian question was off the table for a long time until the 1960s. The Soviets gave the green light to it in 1965 (the 50th anniversary of the genocide), allowing the construction of the Tsitsernakaberd memorial complex in Yerevan. In this way, they sought to gain the sympathy of the Western Armenian communities, which were well integrated into the political and economic life of the countries of residence. The United States and its allies in Europe have Imparted this topic a limited humanitarian overtone. They did not believe in possible profound effect of the Soviet Union on the Atlantic Armenians and, therefore, pragmatically focused on deepening the alliance with Turkey, which should not be irritated. The situation changed in the 1970s, when Ankara began to behave in an “inappropriate” way, increasingly declaring its own interests in isolation from the North Atlantic commune.
In 1974, Turkey, a member of NATO, unilaterally conducted a military operation, occupying Northern Cyprus. In the same year, the American Congress started talking about the events of 1915. The political speed from declamation to drafting the first resolution was impressive – only 6 months.
From that moment on, the “Armenian stick” was waved at any occasion and not only by states, but also by large multinational businesses (the factor of Boeing lobbyists in the resolution on the genocide of 1984).
Pursuing the policy of exploitation of the Armenian question was logical and non-variant due to the absence of any form capable to reflect the unified subjective position of the Armenians. Armenia was part of the Soviet Union, and millions of communities lived in a split state, without becoming a single Diaspora under their own umbrella (like the World Jewish Congress or the Celtic League).
A chance to rethink
A historical chance to change this configuration appeared after the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the independent Republic of Armenia. Fundamental prerequisites have been created to form a single national mission – the construction of a state, which should become a single platform for the Armenians, deprived of all guidance, to unite.
The Armenian tricolor has been hoisted in Yerevan; Artsakh has been liberated and there is a lot of work ahead to strengthen the country which has incredible human potential.
Turkey was not afraid of the fact that independent Armenia would claim some territories or reparations; it was afraid of a completely different thing – the appearance of Armenian statehood in the neighborhood, which systematizes and structures Armenians around the world. They understood the overall potential and had the opportunity to see only a small part of it in a mobilized state during the war with Azerbaijan. Being a responsible state, they just couldn’t ignore it.
Item 11 of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia of 1990 states that “the Republic of Armenia votes for the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide committed in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia in 1915.” It was an important step connecting the state with the Armenian communities,which considered the historical memory of the genocide the only unifying element. Now Armenia assumed responsibility for preserving this memory and passing it on to new generations. However, the same reading lacks the key element – overcoming the consequences of genocide. Without it, the issue of recognition automatically turns into a nice humanitarian slogan. In a short period of 1988-1992, Armenians were subjected to mass ethnic cleansing and exile (Sumgait, Baku, Shahumyan, Maraga, Kirovabad), and military aggression was organized against the Artsakh Armenians. At the same time,eradicating the traces of the Armenian pre-Christian and Christian civilization in the territories of historical Western Armenia and Nakhichevan has not stopped since 1915.
With that in mind, for the Armenian state, the problem of genocide should have been considered exclusively in terms of national security in its broadest sense.
Instead of a comprehensive analysis of its own history and the formation of a national security strategy and the concept of structuring the Armenian world based on its conclusions, the leadership of the Third Republic decided to go another way. At first, they pursued a strategy of ignoring the existence of the Armenian community as a quantitative and qualitative resource and lobbying base for state-building. In the same Declaration of Independence, there is no single word about the significance and importance of Spyurk, except for the only reference to ethnic Armenians being eligible for Armenian citizenship.
Then the local “elites” went further – they began building barriers and walls with barbed wires so that the “communal” Armenians would not even think to look beyond the borders created to them.
No policy of mass and professional repatriation have been mentioned. Moreover, Armenian citizens living outside the country (most of them are communal Armenians) were deprived of the opportunity to vote in the presidential elections at embassies and consulates (if you want to vote, come to Armenia).
Could such a value system give rise to a meaningful position on such a crucial issue as genocide and overcoming its consequences? It is doubtful. Therefore, the so-called “elites” of the community and the “Yerevan” rulers have separated their powers: the former are engaged in what will be loudly and pathetically called the international recognition of the genocide, and the latter are engaged in Armenia’s domestic and foreign policy. As usually in such cases, both “elites”, having found common mercantile interests over time, become one.
It is generally believed that over the past 30 years there has been vast international recognition of the genocide. Many countries, including France, Russia, Canada, and Italy, at various times adopted a certain kind of statement or bills reflecting their position on the events of 1915.
Considering the ideas of humanism and human rights, all these recognitions are important. Calling things by their true names can even become a byword for justice. However, this is only a form having no real value. Today we must understand this more clearly since none of the “genocide-recognizing” states has imposed even symbolic economic and political sanctions against Turkey and Azerbaijan in connection with the armed aggression against the Armenian population of Artsakh, followed by its expulsion, looting and destruction of graves, churches and other national monuments.
There were no protest notes, no recall of ambassadors, no loud resolutions. Nothing – neither in the case of the tortured Artsakh, nor in the case of the gradual process of occupation of Armenia itself, protected by “international law”. What was the point of drafting hundreds of resolutions that so much effort and resources were spent on lobbying their adoption? The answer is simple – in the very word “genocide”, being music to ears, which became the only nationwide criterion of success and triumph.
Surrender of historical memory in the name of “peace”
Today, we can observe the final stage of 30 years of imitation, and the current “Yerevan” elite is preparing to hand over the last thing that still belongs to the Armenians themselves – historical memory. The process of narrowing the Armenian history to the borders of the Third Republic is the first fundamental step in this direction. For the Turkish world, which is preparing to integrate the remains of modern Armenia, this point is one of the key ones in resolving the Armenian question. Historical memory forms the basic criteria of identity, without which the process of national and state building is unthinkable. Ankara understands perfectly well that without a sovereign Armenia as a base for this understanding and projection, the Armenian question will lose all hope for subjectivity. At best, it will return to its usual state – sticks in the hands of third forces.
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Thus, we celebrate the 109th anniversary with the lost Artsakh, the territorial losses of Armenia itself, the loss of 5 thousand soldiers and officers, the loss of dignity and guidance. Frankly speaking, in the long pursuit of illusions and hopes for recognition of the genocide by the international community, the Armenian world forgot the main thing – to recognize this genocide itself.
